At the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945, the young Constantinos Doxiadis (1913–1975) was the leader of the Greek delegation. Educated in Greece as an architect, and with a doctorate in planning from Germany, Doxiadis held a government post as the coordinator of reconstruction in Greece at the time of the conference. He spoke about a global housing crisis and resource shortages, arguing that the United Nations could not achieve its goals for international development unless the organization also put systematic emphasis on the planning of the physical environment. In an open letter criticizing the priorities of the United Nations, he warned:

Legislators, financiers, military men and scientists were asked to give their opinion on the reshaping of the new post-war world, but architects and those responsible for physical planning have been ignored. This, however, is not wise, because the new world will be safe only after it has been reshaped on a new basis.¹

This letter, which circulated among conference delegates, signaled Doxiadis’s debut in the international arena, and his goals were already ambitious: to align modernist visions of social reform with the United Nations’ aim to secure world peace through growth and development. Turning to architects and planners, he urged them to reconceptualize their practice according to the new geopolitical and socioeconomic transformations of the post–World War II era. Simultaneously, he criticized the United Nations for overestimating economic criteria for development and for failing to devote enough resources to
the design of the physical environment. In his vision of modernization, socioeconomic reform had to move hand-in-hand with a comprehensive and orderly transformation of the physical environment, and this required both the recalibration of development practices and the reinvention of architecture and planning.

In the late 1940s, Doxiadis became the coordinator of the Marshall Plan aid to Greece, and later he participated in United Nations and World Bank Technical Assistance missions to newly established nation-states in the postcolonial world. In 1954 he took part in the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning conference, organized in New Delhi under the auspices of the United Nations; there he met Jaqueline Tyrwhitt and Jacob Crane, who would soon become crucial collaborators of his firm. In 1964 he also traveled to Syria as part of the World Bank's mission, and he would later travel to Pakistan, Jordan, and Iraq. These activities allowed him to nurture a strong network of friends and contacts among development officials in U.S. and international development institutions that would prove to be instrumental for his international success.

As he was establishing himself as a player in the scene of international development consulting, Doxiadis also established a private company that aimed precisely to forge strong links between the design of the physical environment and processes of advancing international development. The name "Doxiadis Associates International: Consultants on Development and Ekistics" clearly conveyed the ambition to transcend the typical tasks of architecture and planning firms, and it rapidly succeeded in collaborating with international funding institutions and national governments to design complexes, infrastructures, urban plans, and regional studies in Ghana, Greece, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, the Sudan, and elsewhere. By the early 1960s, Doxiadis was known as a "busy remodeler of the world" and his journal *Ekistics* was circulating internationally.

"Ekistics" was defined by Doxiadis as an entirely new field, "the science of human settlements." Derived from the word "oikos" meaning "home," Ekistics aimed to synthesize the input of all disciplines that could inform the creation of settlements of any scale. As Doxiadis would later explain in his first book on Ekistics, *Architecture in Transition*, "The architect must now enrich his knowledge so as to be able to cover the related fields and co-operate with the community developer, the urbanist, the planner, the economist, the geographer and the social scientist as a member of a single team." The idea of incorporating the input of social sciences to increase architecture's social instrumentality was of course not uncommon in postwar architectural discourse; social scientists themselves initiated such collaborations in an effort to grasp the impact of the physical environment on human behavior and social patterns. Ekistics, however, aspired to bring these interdisci-
The "Ekistic Circles," a sketch made by Doxiadis Associates illustrating the firm's interdisciplinary ethos and its primary objective—development.

Plenary collaborations to new heights, promising to offer a comprehensive response to human needs.

Ekistics was Doxiadis's way of connecting the professions of architecture and planning with the processes of modernization and development around the globe. Its commitment to industrialization and socioeconomic reform was certainly in tune with the agenda of American and international development institutions to advance a particular type of development according to the paradigm of the industrialized West. In the background of such development goals was of course the Cold War's bitter ideological divide. Doxiadis, however, diligently distanced Ekistics from geopolitical leanings by framing it as a scientific method aimed at fulfilling the needs of the "common people" and applicable to all societies, "communist and capitalist alike."7 From the perspective of the international institutions as well as national governments that funded his projects, such a claim to scientific neutrality conveniently concealed the pro-Western alliances (and anticommunist fears) that motivated their modernizing agendas. The technocratic optimism of Ekistics appeared as a promise that social, economic, racial, and ethnic inequalities could be managed away, to make the modernization projects acceptable to (often) highly diverse societies.

Even if Doxiadis believed that his approach embodied scientific truths with transnational applicability, he promised that his firm would calibrate built interventions according to the resources and needs of each specific locale. Doxiadis pledged that he would not act like a "magician planner," who "has all the solutions up his sleeve and he pulls them out like rabbits."8 Often implying criticism for the new cities emerging in the
postcolonial world (and sometimes pointing the finger specifically at Brasilia in Brazil and Chandigarh in India), Doxiadis seemed to suggest that his firm would overcome the functionalist, universalist, and ultimately homogenizing preoccupations of other modernist interventions, by embarking on exhaustive surveys and research programs that would “diagnose” (echoing scientific and medical authority) each locale’s needs and potentials. This dual claim to scientific legitimacy and cultural sensitivity was particularly palatable to many young governments of the postcolonial world, whose eagerness to modernize their state was accompanied by a desire to champion shared ideals of national identity and pride.

Doxiadis’s claims to scientific legitimacy and cultural sensitivity were strengthened by the multinational composition of his group of collaborators and what often appeared as a quasi-Western identity of his own. As The New Yorker put it in a long 1963 article devoted to “the Ekistic World”.

Doxiadis has the sort of European abilities that are needed—he is up on the latest planning techniques, and he runs his firm with northern (or, “western”) efficiency—but, being a Greek, he is free of the imperialist stigma, and, for the same reason, he can do things more cheaply, and often more suitable, for his Afro-Asian clients than a northerner could, because he is more familiar with their customs and standards.

The prejudices behind an argument that set the continents of Africa and Asia, along with the country of Greece, apart from some Western—presumably higher—“standard” are of course a vivid reminder of how much of the postwar drive for modernization was rooted in essentializing worldviews that divided the world into “developed” versus “underdeveloped” cultures and assumed that all cultures were on a linear and predetermined path to progress. It was the belief in these reductionist models of development that allowed mid-twentieth-century development experts to “hurry about the developing world,” as the historian Roger Owen put it, while being “much better at talking than listening.” Doxiadis tried to distinguish himself from the many Western consultants, advisors, and technicians who were streaming into various parts of the postcolonial world, citing his own experiences with postwar reconstruction in Greece that taught him how to enrich his training and expertise with an intimate understanding of local realities. When he would describe his intervention as strong but necessary medicine, however, this key figure of midcentury architectural modernism seemed to buy into developmentalist worldviews that advocated that different countries had to be brought up to speed with the West—failing to recognize development as a cultural process tied to complex circumstances of specific locales. This essay is an investigation into these complexities and contradictions of Doxiadis’s development practices.

The focus is Doxiadis Associates’ interventions in Iraq and Syria, which are representative of this firm’s modernizing ambitions. Examining rural and urban housing in Iraq and urban plans for Syria, I analyze Doxiadis’s concepts of “orderly” physical expansion, his emphasis on nurturing “social balance,” and his conceptions of local particularity and cultural difference that attempted to insert architecture and planning into larger national modernization programs—while also aspiring to recalibrate the developmentalist logic of funding institutions.
MODEL COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ

The Iraq Development Board—a quasi-governmental body overseeing an accelerated program of national modernization in Iraq with the support of Western consultants—became the first international client of Doxiadis Associates in 1955 when it solicited the firm to prepare a housing program for the entire country. At that time, wealth from oil industry revenues had created favorable conditions for development in a young nation trying to establish itself before the outside world, and the pro-British government launched a campaign to introduce a new era of political stability. The Iraq Development Board had been overseeing the construction of dams, irrigation and drainage systems, bridges, roads, factories, power plants, housing, schools, hospitals, and public buildings since the early 1950s. Doxiadis was solicited at a point when the Iraq Development Board increased its funding for housing and community facilities, in an effort to provide more readily visible signs of progress and prevent social unrest.

The need for gestures of social reform seemed urgent as the increasingly unpopular Iraqi government saw uncomfortably obvious parallels between Iraq and Czarist Russia, and was nervously trying to secure political stability. For similar reasons, British and American consultants also encouraged reform, hoping that Iraq, seen as an important Middle Eastern bastion against communism, would not replicate the experience of Egypt, where a 1952 revolt brought the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Soviet-allied policies.

Doxiadis Associates' initial charge was to create a comprehensive five-year plan for the improvement of housing conditions throughout the country, which would involve the construction of tens of thousands of new houses and the amelioration of even more existing units, the construction of schools, and infrastructure projects. The firm began with interventions in Mosul, Basra, Kirkuk, Mussayib, and Baghdad, and eventually it was assigned additional tasks, including the master plan for Baghdad.

The model community Doxiadis proposed for western Baghdad is paradigmatic of Ekistics' housing principles. The Western Baghdad Development Scheme (a few miles west of the existing city center) was to house a population of 100,000, either through government-funded housing or self-help housing. The scheme was comprised of different “community sectors” of 7,000 to 10,000 people, and each sector provided for administrative, social, educational, health, and other community buildings, shopping centers, green areas, coffeehouses, and mosques within walking distance. Echoing the social and functionalist logic of the “neighborhood units” of the postwar British New Towns, the plan provided for a degree of self-sufficiency in each sector, favoring pedestrian movement. Roads were organized according to a rectilinear pattern that also defined the grid system for standardized housing modules. Even if Doxiadis believed that cities were dynamic and needed to accommodate continual growth, each sector had a rather static quality, with a predetermined size and prescribed dimensions for plots, roads, and public areas. This was the firm's solution for preserving human scale in residential communities within a growing metropolis.

Each community sector was broken down to smaller socio-spatial units arranged hierarchically. The smallest, called “community class I,” was constituted by ten to
twenty families of similar income. A group of three to seven such communities made a community “class II,” also having a homogeneous economic status. House types, all of which promised the basics of sanitation and safety, also corresponded to the income-based hierarchy. The hierarchical logic continued: An agglomeration of class II communities plus an elementary school was designated a community “class III.” Class III communities of different income groups, plus a market and shops, a teahouse and a mosque, could constitute a community “class IV,” namely the “community sector” of 7,000 to 10,000. This “community sector,” constituted “the basic element” of Baghdad’s urban plan and was a prototype for the building block of many cities subsequently designed.12 Doxiadis Associates’ plan for western Baghdad was a plan for a community class V (combining a group of sectors of class IV) that would join other parts of the city, to create a class VI community (Baghdad) that would then join larger regional communities, and so on. Rural communities were also situated in a larger regional schema.

In analyzing his work, Doxiadis tried to contextualize such abstractions of “scales” and “hierarchies” by arguing that the smaller class I, II, and III communities of Baghdad corresponded to sizes found in Iraqi towns and villages.18 (The eight volumes of “Diaries,” which compiled notes, photos, and observations by various Doxiadis Associates employees in Iraq between 1955 and 1958, became a key source in extrapolating guidelines for local habitation patterns, material choices, and aesthetic preferences.)
Above: Plan of community sector in western Baghdad. The legend under the full drawing included: 1) mosque, 2) schools, 3) markets, 4) public baths, 5) coffee houses, 6) administration, 8) cultural center, 12) public park, 13) sports ground

Below: Model of community sector in western Baghdad
Typical village for Greater Mussayib, 1959
The larger community scales, then, were explained as new phenomena necessitated by advanced transportation and communication technologies. As Doxiadis's close colleague Jaqueline Tyrwhitt pointed out, the multiple hierarchies of communities were an attempt to correct British versions of "self-contained" neighborhoods in New Towns, that prescribed an optimum size of neighborhoods and were already facing criticism for failing to account for people's increasing dependence on the automobile and new industrial needs for mobility. Doxiadis Associates hoped to introduce more flexibility by inscribing each community within larger ones, although their effort remained bounded by a linear hierarchical logic that assumed that communities and subcommunities could neatly fit into each other.

The formal ordering of the community sector had a social agenda behind it: the small homogeneous residential communities (class I and II) were expected to interact (on a "class III" level and beyond) to promote a slow and controlled intermixing of social classes and the gradual "development of social balance amongst the several classes of the citizens." This was Doxiadis Associates' attempt at social engineering, in tune with the Iraqi regime's campaign to eliminate sectarian and tribal divisions. The strategies for nurturing social balance, however, steered away from the city's intricate tribal, nomadic, ethnic, and other social formations that created tight communities inside the city. For all their field reports and on-site analyses, the firm overlooked the specific demographic dynamics in the city (caused, for example, by the emigration of most of the city's Jewish population to Israel after 1947, or the influx of rural population, including many Christians and Kurds from the north and Shias from the south). The proposals were instead confined to vague references to a "proper" grouping among different communities that would presumably create "a healthy community spirit." Translated into formal gestures, "proper" grouping meant, for example, the insertion of middle-class housing between upper- and lower-income neighborhoods, to minimize contact between opposite sides of the economic spectrum. Some residential sectors were even separated with "green spaces" that acted as soft barriers between classes. Such design strategies were apparently Doxiadis Associates' attempt to compromise with government administrators' demands that "different classes of citizens should not be mixed." Even if tribal and ethnic differences were to be brushed aside in favor of a shared sense of modern nationhood, economic class distinctions were preserved. This demand was made repeatedly by government officials, as Doxiadis Associates' diaries show, and the resulting proposal was less about substantive social equity than about an administrative ordering of society. Understood more in visual and aesthetic terms, this kind of rational ordering of both the urban fabric and society echoed many examples of twentieth-century high-modernist urbanism and its grand visions for the rational engineering of social life. The irony in the case of Doxiadis's partnership with the state is that his Ekistics was framed precisely as a rejection of aesthetic preoccupations in favor of a more comprehensive conception of human needs.

A similar aesthetic of order and efficiency characterized rural plans for Iraq. Based on a rather unidirectional view of design as a process that moves "from the national conception to the detail," Doxiadis's team inserted the villages of Iraq within larger
territorial schemes of community classes arranged hierarchically. Within each rural center, the layout abided again to Doxiadis Associates' requirements for uniformity and standardization, and rural houses were lined up on a modular grid and according to functional zones. The particular physical and social geographies of the village were practically absent because, as Doxiadis emphasized, the firm was not simply faced with the task of designing a village or two, but "types" of villages and buildings "which can be repeated many times."^{24}

As background to Doxiadis Associates' urban and rural proposals were extensive research programs that the firm had launched to examine climatic conditions, sun radiation and wind effects, and geological formations, and to experiment with the orientation of buildings and passive cooling possibilities. Approximating United Nations consultant guidelines to evaluate climatic variations, local materials, and labor, to use them "more fully and rationally," and to increase productivity, temper mechanization, and minimize cost, Doxiadis Associates established guidelines for the selection of materials and construction methods to maximize the economy of housing.^{25} Doxiadis Associates also hired local contractors, asking each to use their

Central market in Mosul, on a cover of *Ekistics*
own familiar building technique, and, acting much like UNESCO’s “field consultants,” they supervised to identify the most economical approach and provide on-the-job training.26

In all urban and rural plans for Iraq, Doxiadis Associates attempted to insert local character into the rational methodology of housing by including hamams, coffee shops, and mosques in each sector, with the occasional covered market with a roof shape reminiscent of traditional souqs. Another gesture was the introduction of a small public square for each group of ten to fifteen attached houses that was to serve as “a modern substitute for the traditional gathering places of tribal life.”27 Initially these were named “gossip squares,” although Doxiadis eventually became uneasy with a term that reinforced cultural stereotypes and replaced it with the more scientific-sounding “community squares of first degree.”28 Such squares were small in scale and informal in character—very different from the huge squares of Chandigarh, with which Le Corbusier tried to replace crowded bazaars and streets; and it was certainly more attentive to the habits and practices of the local past than the boundless public spaces of Brasilia.29 What prevailed most, however, was an aesthetic imperative of standardization and mass production that left little opportunity to contemplate a more cultured conception of the human subject. Still overpowered by the modular functional plan, the squares, hamams, and mosques were stripped of much of their historical and social context and

Gossip square in Mosul
seemed to reflect more an orientalist nostalgia than any profound understanding of Iraq's public life, the intense heterogeneity of its society, or the particularity of its aspirations to modernity.

A similar critique could be extended to Doxiadis Associates' studies of local climate and formal vocabularies. Climatic conditions were treated abstractly in terms of solar exposures, wind patterns, and rainfall data, never really becoming an integral part of material choices, spatial conceptions, or larger design sensibilities. Doxiadis Associates may have recognized the open-air courtyard and colonnaded upper gallery as typical of the region's residential architecture, but the firm's own reinterpretations in its standardized housing modules pushed courtyards to the side or the back of each unit. This compartmentalization was in tune with Doxiadis's notion that however important local knowledge systems were, the Ekistics expert had to maintain "enough distance" to not lose sight of the "demands of efficiency." The final housing schemes lost the traditional courtyards' climatic benefits and secluded qualities. Similarly, Doxiadis Associates' attempts to reinterpret wooden window screens with reinforced concrete produced
larger patterns of openings that were not nearly as effective in increasing wind pressure, softening sunlight, or providing a sense of privacy. Doxiadis Associates' housing units ultimately compared unfavorably to the old city's mud huts with movable roofs, in terms of their microclimate.31

Doxiadis Associates' five-year housing program for Iraq came to an abrupt end in July 1958 when a military coup led by General Abd al-Karim al-Qasim brought the brutal deposition of the Hashimite monarchy and its replacement by a revolutionary republic with socialist leanings. Under these circumstances, Doxiadis Associates' commission was cancelled in May 1959, leaving the Athens-based firm out of the new building boom of Baghdad in the next decade.32 By the time they left, however, Doxiadis Associates had completed the construction of hundreds of units (some neighborhoods in western Baghdad, but also a few in the northeast side of the city and the Army Canal, which are still referred to by the locals as "Doxiadis's houses"), which would become the precedent for many of the firm's future projects.33
Photos and a sketch plan of a house in the Hauran area
from Doxiadis Associates diaries on Syria

MASTER PLANS FOR SYRIA

Doxiadis Associates' development strategies reached far beyond the design of housing and model communities, to the master planning of entire cities and regions. At these larger scales, the imperatives of order and efficiency were accompanied by an emphasis on urban growth, to be facilitated through large-scale functional restructuring. Doxiadis Associates initially tested their strategies in the master plan for Baghdad, commissioned in January 1958, just a few months before the firm had to pull out of Iraq. Another opportunity emerged in June 1959, when the government of the United Arab Republic (established in 1958 after the union of Syria and Egypt) commissioned Doxiadis Associates to prepare master plans for the Syrian cities of Homs and Hama. For Doxiadis, who favored a hierarchical design approach that moved from an urban whole to the individual area, the opportunity to start anew from a master plan was the ideal beginning point.34

When Doxiadis began to collaborate with Syria's Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, the country was already in the midst of a long-term program of economic development, which involved the creation of irrigation and drainage projects, the improvement of transportation and communications infrastructure, the advancement of the manufacturing industry, and the opening of previously unexploited lands for cultivation. Once again, Doxiadis Associates' interventions were seen as a stabilizing force, and as part of the government's efforts to introduce a new era of stability in a country that had experienced immense turmoil since its political independence from France in 1946.

Doxiadis had already traveled to Syria during February–April 1954 as a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and he had produced an extensive two-volume document with notes and photographs on Syria's physical environment that became a key reference for his firm's master plans five years later.35 This two volume "diary," as it was called, charted climatic conditions, analyzed demographic distributions, juxtaposed construction methods of different regions,
considered material choices and costs, and mapped the location and uses of factories, agricultural fields, and archeological sites. It constituted the model for the “Diaries”—such as the Iraq diaries mentioned earlier, that Doxiadis Associates’ teams produced for various countries. If the diaries’ preoccupation with the comprehensive accumulation of data attempted to showcase Doxiadis’s scientific ethos, the abundant photographs of street life and living conditions in rural and urban areas, accompanied occasionally by sketches and comments, revealed another side of Doxiadis’s own sensibilities. The attention to the spatial qualities of streets, the appreciation of the play of shade and light, and the careful recording of details of construction all broaden postwar architectural notions of contextualism and regionalism. They also echoed the ideas of Doxiadis’s mentor Dimitris Pikionis—who, within the context of Greece, pioneered the denunciation of modernist rationalism and valorized site specificity and sentimentality.

When it came to Doxiadis Associates’ proposals for Homs and Hamā, social and spatial qualities of the existing dense fabric that Doxiadis captured in his photographs had to be negotiated with the firm’s preconceived imperatives for a rational and efficient ordering of the city. So even though the Syria diaries produced by Doxiadis had commented positively on the beautiful old souqs, the markets open to the sky, and the closely packed districts of special crafts, the preliminary report for Homs, for example, concluded that the old city suffered from an “irrational” use of land and a lack of open space. This judgment seems to have been more influenced by an adherence to prescribed definitions of density than any understanding of souqs, mosques, and courtyards as spaces with a wide range of social purposes. The plan Doxiadis Associates submitted to the government stipulated the creation of public gardens, open recreational spaces, and wider roads, lumping these needs together with the need for upgrading services for water supply, sewage treatment, and other public utilities. In effect, the proposal was presenting the spatial preference for lower densities to be just as urgent as the tackling of sanitation and health issues. What Doxiadis Associates’ “Summary of Problems” for Homs seems to have missed was that the old city’s urban density had an immense social value, and that the colorful souqs, dark and narrow as they were, provided abundant opportunities for public gathering—even if they did not fit rationalized categories and distribution ratios for buildings and open spaces.

The overall master plans for Homs and Hamā promised to set the basis for the future expansion in an orderly fashion and become a symbol and an instrument for creating an efficient, modern city. The first task was to identify an axis of future growth that imposed an overall territorial order. This idea was based on a planning model that Doxiadis Associates was beginning to develop at the time, based on the notion that the most efficient method of urban expansion was to allow the city center to expand continually along an axis to avert congestion. Echoing the open-ended logic of “Linear City” concepts, Doxiadis Associates’ model would allow the residential areas and business districts to expand continually along the central core’s flanks, and their linear expansion would be controlled by zoning and the siting of public buildings, road systems, and green areas. In the case of Homs and Hamā, the central axis of growth was defined along the north-south direction that connected each urban center to the larger cities.
THE EXISTING CITY OF HOMS

TENDENCIES FOR DEVELOPMENT

Doxiadis Associates' map for Homs showing the predicted direction of growth
Plan for Hama, highlighting the proposed green spaces
of Aleppo and Damascus. In Homs, that central axis was pushed toward the east of the city to bypass the old dense city, and to extend the city eastward, where there was open land for unhindered expansion. In Hama, the main axis defined by the commercial-administrative center went through the center of the city and over the Orontes River, incorporating the old city center within the city's new, expandable center. Major roads were inserted either parallel or perpendicular to each city's axis of growth to create a regular pattern for the residential sectors. The commercial and administrative center was given a linear shape, and its future growth was to follow the central axis. Industries were confined to the edges of each city outside the directions of future north-south growth. "Green spaces" often filled the gaps between the residential grid and the preexisting geographies of each city.

The master plans also outlined the general principles for residential sectors, suggesting the creation of a hierarchy of communities similar to those in Baghdad. The firm's preliminary proposal suggested the formation of "integrated residential communities" so as to transcend the stark distinctions between rich and poor. But the final reports for Homs and Hama that followed the feedback from the government favored a greater degree of class segregation. For Homs, Doxiadis Associates recommended the distribution of income groups "with the highest income groups along the commercial center and green areas." In Hama, the final plan proposed that "the lowest income groups be located near the industries and the outer parts of the city, while the highest income groups... be next to the green areas and the civic center." Such rigid class distinctions were far from Doxiadis Associates' initial experiments for intermixing income groups. Somewhere between the firm's technocratic postures of neutrality and their assumption that state agendas reflect the population's aspirations, Doxiadis Associates remained confined to local power structures instead of transcending them. One can obviously argue that the final reports' proposed segregation is not a result of the designers' strategies but a product of state policies and pressures—part of an ongoing give-and-take between Doxiadis Associates and its client. This is one of the ironies in the firm's collaborations with state modernization practices: The celebrated goal to cater to human needs was reduced to a class-based distribution of services.

As in Baghdad, the master plans for Homs and Hama were not implemented, and after Doxiadis Associates' departure, modernization plans changed direction in both Iraq and Syria, becoming more self-conscious in their anti-Western claims and leaving no room for the kind of universalism Doxiadis advanced. Even local architects (like Mohamed Makki and Rifat Chadirji in Iraq who had previously collaborated with Doxiadis Associates) began to shift direction to abandon the technocratic and universalist ethos of Ekistics in favor of more explicit valorizations of local cultural roots. Ekistics too eventually changed direction in the 1960s, to plans that were not about national modernization but global transnational networks. The firm's work did, however, maintain an emphasis on physical environment as key to global socioeconomic development.
Preliminary Master Plan of Homs

Legend
- Residence
- Commercial and Administrative Center
- Local Centers
- Industrial Regions
- Open Areas
- Military Installations
- Railroad Station
- Garages
- Agricultural School
- Retail Market
- Sport Grounds

Distribution of Income Groups

Incomes
- Maximum
- High
- Medium to High
- Medium to Low
- Low

Doxiadis Associates' final master plan for Homs, juxtaposed with the final proposal for the distribution of income groups
Preliminary Master Plan of Hama

Legend:
- Residence
- Open Areas with Special Buildings
- Commercial and Administrative Center
- Gardens
- Local Centers
- Military Installations
- Industrial Regions
- Railroad Station
- Open Areas
- Cattle

Distribution of Income Groups

Incomes:
- Maximum
- High
- Medium to High
- Medium to Low
- Low

Doxiadis Associates' final master plan for Hama, juxtaposed with the final proposal for the distribution of income groups.
Doxiadis Associates’ prolific practice in the late 1950s was instrumental in linking architectural modernism with postwar development. Their effort to transport architecture to a domain of development managerialism was characterized by many paradoxes: Their optimism for promoting social equality competed with the firm’s alignment with state agendas, which often supported existing hierarchies. Their aspiration to promote transnational equality missed the geopolitical imbalances among their supposed beneficiaries. And even if Doxiadis and his firm emphasized the importance of local particularity, this was often lost in the execution, overshadowed by a fixation on grand ordering. Still, Doxiadis Associates’ attempt to contemplate the dilemmas of Iraq’s and Syria’s post-imperialist identity compares favorably to rigid appropriations of local heritage—see, for example, Frank Lloyd Wright’s orientalizing references in his scheme for the Opera House in Baghdad, not to mention the later Ba’ath regime’s populist distortions of both countries’ cultural heritage—that entirely missed the ambiguities in concepts of local tradition. Despite its shortcomings, Doxiadis Associates’ plans were significant in contemplating the role of architecture/planning in the messy realities of postcolonial nationhood. And even if Doxiadis Associates approximated United Nations development policies, they did not fall into their logic, because they situated their developmentalist ambitions within a nexus of contemporary architectural-planning debates that remained wary of rationalist reductionism. Doxiadis may have been fascinated by the modernist dream of initiating widespread social reform, but he also questioned the elitism of the profession. It was through this combination of developmentalist optimism with socio-architectural concerns that Doxiadis and his firm formed their peculiar conception of modernization, full of nuances, which constitutes a fascinating page in the history of postwar development.

Notes

2. Ibid. Doxiadis often recommended that the United Nations establish a distinct agency for human settlements, but it was not until 1963 that the idea materialized with the establishment of the United Nations ad hoc committee on housing planning and development.
6. For more on the alignments of postwar architectural and planning discourse with social sciences that emerged in that era, see, for example, Hashim Sarkis, “Dances with Margaret Mead: Planning Beirut Since 1958,” in Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City, edited by Peter Rowe and Hashim Sarkis (New York: Prestel, 1998).
9. Ibid.
12. On planning legislation in India, which had applied several aspects of the British planning system, Doxiadis argued, “Are we sure when we mention English legislation and schemes and present them as
an ideal for all the other countries, that the countries are ripe enough to consider this legislation and try to imitate it. We cannot jump immediately to the higher level of planning that has been reached by the countries with much greater experience. "On the other hand, we cannot say that we will require the 200 years that England, for example, has required to reach this stage. We may be able to cover the same distance in 50 years instead of 200—maybe 30 or 35 years, but certainly, we cannot eliminate completely the intermediate stages. Our problem is not how to imitate the more advanced countries—and I am speaking also with experience of and in the name of, I think on this occasion, my own country (Greece)—but how to study the problem of land use and land development which in every phase is going to be balanced with the abilities of our country to implement it. C.A. Doxiadis, "Comments on Land Use Controls and Planning Implementation," Proceedings of the Southeast Asia Regional Conference, Meeting of the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning, New Delhi, February 1-7, 1954 (Government of India Press, 1957), 427-428. Excerpts reprinted in Ekistics 4(7) (December 1957), quotation on 129.


Doxiadis Associates, "Iraq Housing Program."

The demands of Iraqi officials are recorded, for example, in Doxiadis Associates, Iraq Diaries, v. 1 (1955) [Archives Files 23873, Constantininos Doxiadis Archive].

Among the systematic critiques of modernist urbanism, and a key exposition of the technocratic utopianism of high modernism in many realms of practice, is the work of James Scott, Seeing Like a State How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

Doxiadis, "Plans for Village in Mussyab by Professor Fathy" (21 July 1958): 1-2, quotation on 1. For an example of how the firm's emphasis on standardization shaped the architecture of rural houses specifically, see the discussion of the debates between Doxiadis and one of the members of his team, Hassan Fathy, in P. Pyla, "Hassan Fathy Revisited: Postwar Discourses on Science, Development, and Vernacular Architecture," Journal of Architectural Education 63(3) (February 2007): 28-39.

United Nations, FAO, Inter-Agency Working Party on Housing and Related Community Activities, "Extension of Low-Cost Housing and Related Community Facilities," January 1959. Reprinted in Ekistics 7:44, 458-466, quotation on 458. See also the report on the 1963 Committee on housing Building and Planning, in which Doxiadis participated. According to this report, one of the tasks of the UN Committee on Housing building and Planning was to develop practical proposals to assist developing countries on such matters as "low cost housing in different climates or cultures, improved building materials and their better use, and ways of promoting acceptance and adoption of efficient organizational and building techniques." UN EEC/UNAs Committee on housing Building and Planning, "Provisional Agenda, Jan. 1963" [UN Documents E/C.6/3] (1963).

UNESCO promoted the idea of "field consultants," from the late 1940s. UNESCO, "Report of the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Commission," UNESCO C/21/Rev 1, 22 (January 1947): 6. By the 1960s, education and training became very important. The UN Special Fund, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and Private organizations like the Ford Foundation, promoted training programs for officials in public administration, and financial and...
economic fields. See Barbara Ward, "The Decade of Development: A Study in Frustration," first published in 1965 by the Overseas Development Institute, then in Two Views on Aid to Developing Countries [London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1966]; ref on 31-32.


29 From James Holston's argument about the pitfalls of the modernist city's urban density, one can argue that the figure-ground relationships in Doxiadis Associates' plan compare favorably to those encountered in Brasilia. See Holston, The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989], 119-136.


32 In the 1960s local firms took on a huge volume of work, and after the creation of the first school of architecture in Iraq in 1959, the number of local professionals grew dramatically.


34 A similar opportunity would appear in the design of Ismailabad, which gave the maximum freedom for a comprehensive master plan.

35 The diaries accompanied Doxiadis's report on Syria, submitted to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This report served as a reference for the World Bank's Community and Development, n.f.e., 91.


37 Demetris Pikionis, who guided Doxiadis's early training in architecture, was a vigorous critic of modernist rationalism, which he believed threatened to strip architecture from a "plethora of virtues" and "sentiment." Pikionis's own projects passionately emphasized site-specificity. Even if Doxiadis, from early in his career, was more interested in the efficiency of urban plans and the mass production of houses than the aesthetics of a single edifice or the intricate particularities of a landscape, Doxiadis often recognized Pikionis as one of his major influences. Jaqueline Tyrwhitt refers to Pikionis as one of the three major influences in Doxiadis's early life. Tyrwhitt, "Background to C.A. Doxiadis's Ecology and Ekistics," Ekistics 266 (January 1978): 12-19, esp. 13-14. This was also confirmed by another close associate of Doxiadis, Panayis Pomonopoulos, in an interview with the author; Athens, 27 July 2005.


41 This urban model was at still at its beginning stages in the plans for Syria. It was further developed and implemented in the planning of Ismailabad, and Doxiadis would later call this planning concept "Dyopolis." For more on the connections of Dyopolis to Linear City concepts, see Pyla, »Back to the Future," 19.

42 Doxiadis Associates, "Plan for the City of Homs, Syria," quotation on 278.


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CONTENTS

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 4

INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT HISTORIES AND THE PHYSICAL LANDSCAPE OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN PANAYIOTA PYLA

DAMS, IRRIGATION, AND INFRASTRUCTURE
1 ROWING BOATS IN THE RESERVOIR: INFRASTRUCTURE AS TRANSPLANTED SEASCAPE ASLIHAN DEMIRTAŞ 16


3 CONTROL ROOM: VISIBLE AND CONCEALED SPACES OF THE ASWAN HIGH DAM ELIZABETH BISHOP 72

URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS
4 MODERNIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS IN POST-1950S THESSALONIKI: URBAN CHANGE AND URBAN NARRATIVES ELENI BASTEA AND VILMA HASTAOGLOU-MARTINIDIS 90

5 RESIDENTIAL ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN LANDSCAPE IN ISTANBUL SINCE 1950 SIBEL BOZDOĞAN 118

HOUSING/SETTLEMENTS
6 STATE-CONSTRUCTED EVERYDAY: ENVISIONING A PLACE FOR THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY RACHEL KALLUS 144

7 ARCHITECTS AS DEVELOPMENT EXPERTS: MODEL COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ AND SYRIA PANAYIOTA PYLA 166

8 IMPROVISING URBANISM IN POSTWAR ATHENS (1952–1974): TECHNIQUES AND PROCESSES OF ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT IOANNA THEOCHAROPOULOU 190

CONTRIBUTORS 212