

4 Baghdad's Urban Restructuring, 1958

Aesthetics and Politics of Nation Building

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In August 1955 the Iraq Development Board, a quasi-governmental body overseeing an accelerated program of national modernization in the young nation of Iraq, solicited the Greek architect and planner Constantinos A. Doxiadis to prepare an ambitious housing program for the entire country. Chaired by Iraq's premier and supported by Western consultants, the IDB had at its disposal the lion's share of the country's oil revenues (which increased dramatically in the early 1950s as foreign ownership of the Iraqi petroleum industry diminished), and it used them to fund the construction of dams, irrigation and drainage systems, power plants, bridges, roads, factories, schools, hospitals, and other buildings.¹ Doxiadis was brought on board at the point in time when the IDB had decided to increase its emphasis on housing and community facilities, in an effort to prevent social unrest by providing more visible signs of progress.² The need for popular gestures of social reform seemed urgent because the increasingly unpopular Iraqi government, ruled by the Hashimite dynasty installed by the British in 1921, saw "uncomfortably obvious" parallels between Iraq and Czarist Russia, and was nervously hoping to secure political stability in order to sustain itself. For similar reasons, British and American consultants also encouraged reform, hoping that Iraq, which was seen as an important Middle Eastern bastion against Communism, would not replicate the experience of Egypt, where a 1952 revolt had brought Gamal Abdel Nasser to power, along with his Soviet-allied policies.³

Doxiadis's initial charge was to create a comprehensive five-year plan for

the improvement of housing conditions throughout the country, and his firm began with projects in Mosul, Kirkuk, Mussayib, and Baghdad. In 1958, while the firm was already engaged in the construction of various rural and urban housing schemes, it was also assigned the task of creating a new master plan for the rapidly expanding city of Baghdad. As the administrative capital of a new nation, Baghdad became the focus of the IDB's activities. An earlier master plan, developed jointly by the British firm Minoprio & Spencely and P. W. Macfarlane in 1956, had instituted zoning principles and proposed the development of a system of roads to connect Baghdad's premodern urban core to its new river bridges.⁴ Doxiadis Associates' master plan aspired to provide a more comprehensive framework for modernization. By incorporating the pilot projects Doxiadis Associates had already launched in the capital beginning in 1955, the firm made a double promise that the new comprehensive restructuring would improve housing for all while providing the foundation for long-term urban and regional growth.⁵

This essay focuses on Doxiadis's 1958 master plan for Baghdad. Moving from a discussion of the overall master plan to the design and construction of specific housing units and public squares, the essay demonstrates how Doxiadis's conceptions of social reform and regional particularity, along with his technocratic postures of neutrality, became intertwined with the Iraqi regime's aspirations to assert the young nation's modernity and to nurture pride among its citizens. The goal is twofold: (1) to uncover how Doxiadis's formal and social experiments were appropriated as vehicles for building a modern nation state, and (2) to simultaneously demonstrate that postcolonial Baghdad was a significant site in the larger rethinking of architectural modernism that characterized the post–World War II era. Since new visions for reconstructing Baghdad are once again becoming current, it is particularly important to put this recent history of the city in critical perspective.

DOXIADIS'S APPEAL

Doxiadis, who had been a Greek government official from 1945 to 1951, first as the coordinator of postwar reconstruction and then as the administrator of the Marshal Plan in Greece, was well known in American and international development circles, and he was recommended to the Iraq Development Board by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.⁶ Doxiadis was at that time taking his very first steps in establishing a private practice, and even though he had little to show in terms of independent built works (he barely had any staff when the IDB solicited him in 1955), he succeeded

in securing this commission, which would soon become the stepping stone for his prolific international practice.⁷ What made Doxiadis appealing to the IDB was partly his Greek background that rendered him free of “imperialist stigma” and distinguished him from most of the other Western consultants, advisers, and technicians who were streaming into Iraq.⁸ Doxiadis’s appeal also stemmed from his planning approach, which he called “Ekistics”—an approach that emphasized a rational and scientific version of urbanism and that gave his proposals an apolitical authority.

Defined as “the science of human settlements,” Ekistics was initially formulated by Doxiadis during his work in Greece, and it promised to synthesize the input of economics, geography, sociology, anthropology, and other sciences. Emblematic of a modernist ambition to coordinate the entire system of knowledge about the physical environment, Ekistics’ multidisciplinary approach had a twofold goal. The first goal was to reject the ethos of the individual signature-designer and to emphasize the necessity of addressing basic human needs, well beyond functionalist or technological concerns.⁹ The second goal of Ekistics aimed to reinvent architects and planners as development experts by emphasizing the significance of the physical environment in promoting socioeconomic development in the post World War II era.¹⁰ Ekistics’ commitment to international urbanization, industrialization, and socioeconomic modernization was in tune with the agenda of international development institutions to restructure the so-called underdeveloped countries of the world according to the paradigm of the industrialized West. However, Doxiadis’s emphasis on a rational and scientific planning approach conveniently obscured such ideological leanings. His standard claim was that Ekistics’ clients were simply the “common people” of any society, “communist and capitalist alike.”¹¹ From the perspective of the Iraq Development Board, such a claim to scientific neutrality conveniently concealed the anti-Communist fears and pro-Western alliances that motivated the IDB’s own modernizing agenda. Furthermore, Doxiadis’s pledge that social, economic, racial, and ethnic inequalities could be managed away by benevolent technocrats promised to make his firm’s interventions more acceptable to the highly diverse citizenry of Iraq.

Another equally important reason for Doxiadis’s appeal was that, even as he claimed that Ekistics would apply scientific truths transnationally, he promised to make his interventions amenable to local cultural preferences. Doxiadis pledged not to act like a “magician planner” who “has all the solutions up his sleeve and he pulls them out like rabbits.”¹² Often implying criticism of the new cities, like Brasilia in Brazil and Chandigarh in India, Doxiadis promised that his firm’s proposals would emerge out of exhaustive surveys and

research programs that would “diagnose” each locale’s needs and potential (notice the scientific and medical authority assumed), and that he would overcome the functionalist, universalist, and ultimately Eurocentric and homogenizing preoccupations of other modernist approaches.¹³ His dual claim both to scientific legitimacy and cultural sensitivity was the right combination for the Iraq Development Board, whose eagerness to provide architectural symbols of the modern state was accompanied by a desire to champion a shared ideal of national identity and pride.

RESTRUCTURING THE CITY

To understand the context of Doxiadis’s proposal for Baghdad, it is important to remember that the city had been experiencing dramatic transformations since early in the twentieth century, when its administration changed hands from the Ottomans to the British. In 1921, when the British established the constitutional monarchy that brought the Hashimites to power in the newly formed Iraq, Baghdad became the capital of the new nation, and since then, it grew by leaps and bounds, both in size and population. In 1932, Iraq became independent, but after a series of tribal and ethnic revolts, military coups and counter-coups, it was reoccupied by the British, who installed a pro-Western government in 1941. From the 1920s to the 1940s, Baghdad’s population tripled, reaching more than half a million, and the city burst out of its centuries-old confines—circumscribed by the settlement of Rusafah on the east bank of the Tigris, Al-Karkh on the west bank, and Kazimiyah and Azimiyah farther north. Especially after the 1920s, with the construction of a flood protection dyke that stretched from the Tigris north of Azimiya to the Diyala River east of Karradah, the urban reach of Baghdad expanded laterally in two directions: northwest toward Azimiyah, and southwest toward the Diyala (fig. 4.1).¹⁴ Some large-scale government-sponsored developments (e.g., the 1920s Waziriyah) introduced systematic layouts, broad avenues, and suburban neighborhoods that stood in stark contrast to Rusafa’s medieval feel—characterized by souks and narrow, tunnel-like residential streets running under the projecting wooden upper-stories of the densely built houses.¹⁵

In the 1950s, with the establishment of the Iraq Development Board, Baghdad experienced an even more rapid transformation, and by the time Doxiadis Associates began to implement its master plan, Baghdad had become a magnet for new businesses and also the site of ambitious experiments by




FIG. 4.1. *Map of Baghdad, 1957.* University of Illinois Map Library.

world-famous architects.¹⁶ Le Corbusier was invited to build a mammoth sports stadium; Walter Gropius, of The Architects Collaborative, to design a university campus; Alvar Aalto to design a civic center; Frank Lloyd Wright to design an Opera House; and there were others.¹⁷ Iraqi architects, most of whom had been educated in Europe, also became involved; these included Mohamed Makiya, Kahtan Awni, and Rifat Chadirji.

The Doxiadis Associates master plan was based on a planning model of urban expansion, control, and efficiency that Doxiadis would later call “Dynapolis.”¹⁸ Meaning “dynamic city,” Dynapolis was one of the many neologisms that Doxiadis coined, which made a glossary a necessary feature of his later books. The core idea of Dynapolis was for the city to expand continually along one axis, to avert congestion, and for the business district to grow along this axis, controlled by zoning and the siting of public buildings,

road systems, and green areas. Residential areas would also expand continually, along the core's flanks, echoing the open-ended logic of other "linear city" concepts, such as Arturo Soria y Mata's 1882 *Ciudad Lineal*, Tony Garnier's 1901 *Cité Industrielle*, and the Soviet Linear Cities of the 1930s.¹⁹

The concept of Dynapolis was to guide Baghdad's orderly expansion and become a symbol and instrument for creating an efficient modern capital. Doxiadis Associates identified the Tigris River as the reference for establishing the central axis of growth. Even though the concept theoretically allowed for indefinite urban expansion, Doxiadis set the ideal population limit of the future Iraqi capital at three million inhabitants—about three times larger than the 1958 population. This idealized population figure suggested certain maximum geographical limits for the city, defined by an elongated rectangle oriented along the main northwest-southeast axis of the river (see fig. 4.2).²⁰ This rectangular area was subdivided by a system of roads which incorporated some of the existing major roads, but which also suggested that the opening of new roads would be adapted to the rectilinear pattern of the new city. The new road system would provide "an easy connection of the city to the country," to tie the city into a larger regional schema.²¹ Residential sectors and subsectors would also be arranged according to this rectangular grid, but modified in the center to accommodate the commercial district. The commercial district would include the existing old city center and also the new commercial centers that were expected to emerge along the main axis of the Dynapolis. The new commercial centers would have to abide by the rectilinear logic of the road system and residential grid. The same logic would also guide the placement of industrial districts, which would be pushed to the edges of the city, so as to preserve the uniformity of the residential and commercial districts. Any gaps left between the imposed grid and the winding river would be designated "green space," the firm's attempt at resolving competing rectilinear and organic geometries.

The master plan revealed a preoccupation with visual order, uniformity, and regularity, and a wholesale preference for low density building and wide streets. Such aesthetic preferences were common among planning experts working in Baghdad at the time, and they were emphasized repeatedly, as much as the need for fresh water, electric power, and sewage systems.²² The plan's blanket dismissal of the old city's urban density failed to recognize its social role and ignored the fact that the colorful souks of the old city, despite their narrowness and darkness (or because of it!), had an immense social value. The shortcomings of such a preoccupation with an aesthetic of order and regularity would become even more pronounced in the specific housing projects proposed by Doxiadis, described below.





FIG. 4.2. *Master Plan for Baghdad, Iraq, 1958*. Cover illustration for “Progress of the Housing Program,” Doxiadis Associates Monthly Report no. 46, May 1959.

A MODEL COMMUNITY IN WEST BAGHDAD

The Doxiadis Associates’ restructuring of the city along functional lines became the basis for the design of a model community in the west part of the city. The Western Baghdad Development Scheme was planned to house a population of 100,000 inhabitants, either through government-funded housing or through self-help housing. The scheme proposed different “community sectors” of 7,000 to 10,000 people, with each sector providing administrative, social, educational, health, and other community buildings, shopping centers, green areas, coffee houses, and mosques (see figs. 4.3 and 4.4). Echoing the social and functionalist logic of the “neighborhood units” of the post–World War II British New Towns, the plan provided key social facilities within walking distance, favoring pedestrian movement. Even though the overall plan emphasized dynamic growth, the size of each sector was predetermined and the dimensions of each plot, roads, and public



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| 1 Mosque | 5 Coffee Houses | 9 Public Health Centre | 13 Sports Ground |
| 2 School | 6 Administration | 10 Police Station | 14 Open Air Theatre |
| 3 Market | 7 Red Crescent | 11 Shops | |
| 4 Public Baths | 8 Cultural Centre | 12 Public Park | |

FIG. 4.3. Plan of community sector in West Baghdad. From Constantinos A. Doxiadis, *Architecture in Transition*, 109.



FIG. 4.4. Model of community sector in West Baghdad. From Constantinos A. Doxiadis, *Architecture in Transition*, 113.

areas within it were also prescribed in an effort to preserve each sector's human scale.

Doxiadis Associates' logic of functional separation extended to the system of social ordering. Each community sector of Western Baghdad would be broken down into smaller socio-spatial units arranged hierarchically. The smallest, called "community class I," would comprise from ten to twenty families of similar income levels. A grouping of three to seven such communities would comprise a "class II" community, which would also have a homogenous economic status. House types would also correspond to this income-based hierarchy, but each promised to provide the basics of sanitation and safety. The hierarchical logic continued: An agglomeration of class II communities plus an elementary school would be designated as a "class III" community. Class III communities made up of different income groups, plus a market and shops, a teahouse and a mosque, could constitute a "class IV" community, also known as the "community sector" comprising seven thousand to ten thousand individuals. This "community sector" would constitute "the basic element" of Baghdad's urban plan, and it was actually a prototype for the basic element of many of the cities that were subsequently designed.²³ Doxiadis Associates' overall plan for West Baghdad was actually a plan for a class V community (combining a group of class IV sectors), which would join other parts of the city to create a class VI community (Baghdad) that would then join larger regional communities, and so on.

Doxiadis tried to contextualize his abstractions of "scales" and "hierarchies" by arguing that the smaller class I, II, and III communities corresponded to community sizes found in Iraqi towns and villages.²⁴ The larger-scale communities, then, were justified as new phenomena that were necessitated by the advanced transportation and communication technologies of the modern era. The vision of a multiplicity of communities aimed to provide a corrective to British versions of "self-contained" neighborhoods in New Towns, which prescribed an optimum size for neighborhoods, and which already were being criticized for failing to account for people's increasing dependence on the automobile and for the new industrial need for the mobility of populations.²⁵ Doxiadis Associates hoped to introduce some flexibility to the idea of optimum size by inscribing each community within larger ones. Ironically, however, the firm continued to be bound by a hierarchical logic that oversimplified the complexities of the urban environment by assuming that communities and sub-communities could neatly fit into each other, and by too precipitously accepting the notion of the social and economic harmony of parts and wholes.

A similar preoccupation with an efficient ordering of the city was reflected in the way social groups were organized. The small homogeneous residential communities that Doxiadis Associates defined (class I and II), that would then interact (on a class III level and beyond) with one another, were meant to promote the slow and controlled intermixing of social classes and the gradual “development of social balance amongst the several classes of the citizens.”²⁶ This was Doxiadis Associates’ attempt at social engineering, in tune with the Iraqi regime’s campaign to eliminate sectarian and tribal divisions. Doxiadis Associates’ proposals, however, remained oblivious to the specific demographic dynamic of the city (caused, e.g., by the emigration of most of the city’s Jewish population to Israel after 1947, or the influx of rural populations, including many Christians and Kurds from the north and Shi’as from the south). For all of the firm’s reports, Doxiadis Associates never acknowledged these transformations and avoided any specific reflection on the city’s intricate tribal, nomadic, ethnic, and other social formations that created tight communities inside the city. The proposals were instead confined to vague references to the “proper” grouping from among different communities that would allegedly create “a healthy community spirit.”²⁷ A look at the plan gives us a hint as to what the “proper” grouping of social groups actually meant: the plan usually called for middle-class housing to be inserted between upper-income and lower-income neighborhoods, as if to prevent the direct contact of people from opposite ends of the economic spectrum. Some residential sectors were even separated by “green spaces” that acted as soft barriers between classes. In short, the proposed design strategies had more to do with an administrative ordering of the society than with any vision of social equity. Such preoccupation with the rational ordering of both the urban fabric and the society, understood more in visual and aesthetic terms, was typical of twentieth-century high-modernist urbanism and its grand vision for the rational engineering of social life.²⁸ The irony, in Doxiadis’s particular case, is that he had systematically framed Ekistics as an anti-stylistic approach that deemphasized aesthetics in favor of responding to basic human needs.

LOCAL PARTICULARITY IN THE FUNCTIONAL PLAN

Certain aspects of the master plan attempted to accommodate local social habits and formal vocabularies, as if to insert local character into the rational methodology of housing. One gesture was the introduction of a so-called gossip square for every grouping of ten to fifteen attached houses. These squares were to serve as “a modern substitute for the traditional gathering



FIG. 4.5. *Gossip square* in Baghdad. From Ekistics (June 1958): 281.

places of tribal life," and would facilitate the transformation of the village dweller into an urban dweller (see fig. 4.5).²⁹ The gossip square was an idea that originated with the Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy, who joined the Ekistics group in 1957, and its name was apparently inspired by the observation that similar loci existed in the traditional neighborhoods of Baghdad and that these were usually the places where neighborhood women would gather.³⁰ Overlooking the deep-rooted gender stereotyping (not to mention the orientalist bias) that the name "gossip square" implied, the firm embraced the concept as a planning element that demonstrated its cultural sensitivity. The strategy was effective in attracting favorable press. A *New York Times* report, for example, argued that the new housing in Baghdad compared favorably to other modernist interventions:

Iraqi housing authorities, instead of razing the existing slums and erecting tenements on their site, are creating groups of new sub-hamlets in the adjoining countryside to provide the close family and tribal relationship the rural Arab knew in his ancestral home. . . . The sub-hamlets are built

in groups of ten or fifteen small attached houses beside a pedestrian way, at the end of which is a small gossip square.³¹

The article went on to praise Doxiadis Associates' interventions, giving them an anti-Communist spin! By nurturing a strong sense of community, the article claimed, the new housing was combating the void and loneliness felt in other, unsuccessful urban environments, which were threatening to make urban dwellers "overly susceptible to conversion by Communist agents."³² In other words, the desire for harmony and community spirit was intimately tied to the anxieties of the Cold War.

In addition to the gossip square, the Doxiadis plan also called for the inclusion of hammams and mosques in each sector, and the occasional covered market with a roof shape reminiscent of the traditional souks. Such gestures, however, revealed more about the orientalist nostalgia of the plan's authors (Why were mosques and hamams the building types singled out?) than they reflected any profound understanding of Iraqi public life, of the intense heterogeneity of its society, or of the inhabitants' aspirations to modernity. Overpowered by the plan's modular functionality, these gossip squares, hamams, and mosques appeared as mere relics of a past, subsumed by the grand formal and social order of Dynapolis.

A similar criticism could be extended to Doxiadis Associates' studies of local climate and formal vocabularies. Climatic conditions were treated abstractly, in terms of solar exposure, wind patterns, and rainfall data, and were never really an integral part of the material choices, spatial conceptions, or larger design sensibilities of the plan. Doxiadis Associates may have recognized the open-air courtyard and colonnaded upper gallery as typical of the region's residential architecture, but the firm's own reinterpretation of these elements in its standardized "house types" pushed such courtyards to the side or back of each unit, where they lost their original climate benefits and secluded qualities (see figs. 4.6 and 4.7).³³ Similarly, Doxiadis Associates' attempts to reinterpret traditional wooden window screens with reinforced concrete produced larger patterns of openings that were not nearly as effective in promoting cooling breezes, softening harsh sunlight, or providing a sense of privacy. This is why, despite all the research and experimentation, in terms of microclimate, Doxiadis Associates' housing units compared unfavorably to the old city's mud huts with their movable roofs.³⁴ In the end, the courtyards and screens of the old city were compartmentalized in the plans for the new city into mass production elements. Moreover, the firm's insistence on attaching specific functional uses to each space—which, incident-

tally, echoed early modernist preoccupations with functional simplicity and single-use zoning—overlooked the multiplicity of purposes in domestic space, failing to recognize, for example, the inhabitant's tendency to migrate from room to room, depending on daily and seasonal comfort considerations.³⁵ What ultimately prevailed was an aesthetic imperative of standardization, which left little opportunity to contemplate a more cultured conception of the human subject, or to conceive of development itself as a cultural process tied to place.

CONCLUSION

Despite the Iraqi government's attempts to secure political stability through modernization and the nurturing of national pride, a military coup in July 1958, led by General Abd al-Karim al-Qasim, brought about the brutal deposition of the Hashimite monarchy and its replacement by a revolutionary republic with socialist leanings (until, eventually, a series of coups d'état would eventually establish the Baath Party as the only legitimate party). In this new climate, modernization plans changed direction and now emphasized a more anti-Western version of nationalism that left no room for the kind of universalism Doxiadis had advanced. By 1959, even local architects like Makiya and Chadirji, who had previously collaborated with Doxiadis Associates, shifted direction toward the valorization of local cultural roots. Under these circumstances, Doxiadis Associates' commission was cancelled in May 1959, leaving the Athens-based firm out of the new building boom in Baghdad in the subsequent decade.³⁶ By the time of their departure, however, Doxiadis Associates had constructed hundreds of dwelling units (some in western Baghdad, but also a few on the northeast side of the city and near the Army Canal)—housing that would set a precedent for many of the firm's future projects.³⁷ After Doxiadis Associates' left Iraq, their master plan for Baghdad was abandoned, although it occasionally became a reference point for later proposals. The handful of neighborhoods Doxiadis Associates developed on the northeast side of the city, for example, became the starting point for an enormous residential area that expanded along a rectilinear pattern and that became known as Al Thawra.³⁸

Looking back at the master plan today, one can smile at the naive certainty of Doxiadis's predictions for the future, which, for all their comprehensive claims, failed to account for the impact of war, international trade sanctions, political and military relationships, and the other geopolitical power dynamics which, we now know, would shape Baghdad's future. (Even Doxiadis's




FIG. 4.6. House types in West Baghdad. From Doxiadis Associates, "The Housing Program of Iraq," 11-12.




FIG. 4.7. Upper-income housing in West Baghdad. From Doxiadis Associates, "The National Housing Program of Iraq," 53.

prediction of an ideal population of three million inhabitants grossly underestimated the growth of the city, whose population now stands at four and a half million). One must concede, nonetheless, that for all the pitfalls of Doxiadis's interventions, his firm's attempt to contemplate the dilemmas of Iraq's post-imperialist identity compares favorably when viewed against the rigid appropriations of the local heritage, as seen in the work of Frank Lloyd Wright and his orientalized references to the tales of *A Thousand and One Nights*, or in the later Baath regime's populist distortions of the country's cultural heritage that treated concepts of local tradition and heritage as entirely unambiguous.³⁹ Despite its flaws, Doxiadis Associates' plan was significant in contemplating the role of architecture and planning in the messy reality of postcolonial nationhood. And, in fact, because of the ironies of his intervention, Doxiadis's tactics of physical and social restructuring have gained an altogether new relevance today, when new strategies for reconstruction and nation-building in Iraq are being debated all over again.

NOTES

This material will appear in a revised version as "Back to the Future: Doxiadis's Plans for Baghdad, 1955–58," in a forthcoming issue (2007–8) of the *Journal of Planning History*.

1. For the Iraq Development Board's funding and its activities at the time, see Fahim Issa Qubain, *The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950–1957* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1958), vii, xi; Ishan Fethi, "Contemporary Architecture in Baghdad," *Process Architecture* (May 1985): 112–32; and Kathleen Langley, *The Industrialization of Iraq* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), 81. For a more recent, critical discussion of the IDB's social agenda, see Joseph Siry, "Wright's Baghdad Opera House and Gammage Auditorium: In Search of Regional Modernity," *Art Bulletin* (June 2005): 365–11.
2. Waldo Bowman, "A Modern Mesopotamia Is Molded," *Engineering News-Record*, December 12, 1957, 34–54.
3. "Development in Iraq: Special Survey," *The Economist* 183, no. 5939 (June 22, 1957): 14–page supplement after p. 1076 [Summary reprinted in *Ekistics* 5, no. 28 (January 1958): 45–48].
4. P. W. Macfarlane, "The Plan for Baghdad, the Capital of Iraq," *Housing Review* 5 (November–December 1956): 193–95; and Minoprio & Spencely and P. W. Macfarlane, "Plan for Baghdad, Iraq," in *Architecture in the Middle East*, special issue of *Architectural Design* 27 (March 1957): 74–78.

5. Doxiadis Associates, "The Master Plan of Baghdad," *Monthly Bulletin* 9 (January 1960).
6. For the IBRD role in Iraq, see World Bank, *The Economic Development of Iraq: Report of a Mission Organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the Request of the Government of Iraq* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1952); and Kahdim al-'Eyd, *Oil Revenues and Accelerated Growth: Absorptive Capacity in Iraq* (New York: Praeger, 1979).
7. After receiving the commission in Iraq, Doxiadis Associates was solicited by many emerging nation-states, and by 1959 Doxiadis's Athens-based firm had established branches not only in Baghdad, but also in Karachi, Beirut, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Washington, D.C.
8. As Floyd Ratchford, the American development consultant who collaborated with Doxiadis in Iraq, would put it, Doxiadis "represents something new on the international 'technical assistance' scene." Later, a *New Yorker* article would explain Doxiadis's success as follows: "Doxiadis has the sort of European abilities that are needed—he is up on the latest planning techniques, and he runs his firm with northern (or, 'western') efficiency—but, being a Greek, he is free of the imperialist stigma" (Christopher Rand, "The Ekistic World," *The New Yorker*, May 11, 1963, 53).
9. Doxiadis had obviously assimilated some of the contemporary architectural debates in Europe and the United States that rejected mechanistic views and emphasized the multiplicity of human needs, non-functional concerns, sentiments, emotions, and values. For an overview of the key debates in the European post World War II architectural scene, see Sarah Williams Goldhagen and Réjean Legault, eds., *Anxious Modernisms* (Montreal: Canadian Centre for Architecture; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
10. For Doxiadis's arguments on the alignments between Ekistics and international development, see, e.g., "Report by C. A. Doxiadis, Expert, Greece," in *Mass Housing in Rapidly Developing Tropical and Subtropical Areas* (Rotterdam: International Council for Building Research Studies and Documentation, 1959), 1–38 and esp. 6–7.
11. Constantinos A. Doxiadis, "The Science of Ekistics," *Architektoniki* 3, no. 13 (1959): 9–72 (quotation on p. 13).
12. Constantinos A. Doxiadis, "The Rising Tide and the Planner," *Ekistics* 7, no. 39 (January 1959): 4–10 (quotation on p. 6).
13. Ibid.
14. John Gulick, "Baghdad: Portrait of a City in Physical and Cultural Change," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 33, no. 4 (1967): 246–55.
15. For a description of Waziriyah and Rusafah, see Gulick, "Baghdad," 246,

250. See also John Searles, "City Problems Observed in Iraq, Greece, Germany," *Journal of Housing* (March 1959): 91–94.

16. "Architects Build Modern Baghdad," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 2, 1958, sec. 2. (Summary reprinted in *Ekistics* 5, no. 32 (May 1958): 244–46.)

17. Fethi, "Contemporary Architecture in Baghdad," 127. For a more recent overview of the modernization of Baghdad in this period, see Nicolai Ouroussoff, "In Search of Baghdad," *Los Angeles Times*, December 14–16, 2003.

18. Constantinos A. Doxiadis, "Dynapolis, The City of the Future," Articles—Papers / 2529, Constantinos A. Doxiadis Archives, Athens, Greece.

19. Linear cities were often mentioned in commentaries about Dynapolis; see, e.g., Richard Llewelyn-Davis, "Town Design," *Town Planning Review* (October 1966), [157]-72.

20. In its later versions, Dynapolis would advance in only one direction, but in its first Baghdad version, its planned growth was towards two opposite directions.

21. Doxiadis Associates, "The Master Plan of Baghdad," *Monthly Bulletin* 9 (January 1960): 1–8. Doxiadis Associates inserted every city into a grand schema of a global network of cities that was supposed to establish an equilibrium with the earth's natural environment. For a discussion of Doxiadis's vision of a global urban network, see Panayiota Pyla, "Gray Areas in Green Politics," *Thresholds* 14 (Spring 1997): 48–53 and Panayiota Pyla, "Ecumenopolis, Ecumenokepos, and Doxiadis's Environment-Development Politics," in M. Christine Boyer, Anna Hardman, and Alexandros-Andreas Kyrtsis, eds., *Space and Progress: Constantinos Doxiadis's Ekistics and the Global Context of Post World War II Planning, Architecture, Urbanization and Reconstruction* (Springer, forthcoming).

22. See, for example, "The Master Plan of Baghdad" and "The Housing Program of Iraq" (1959) (Constantinos A. Doxiadis Archives, Athens, Greece), especially the section titled "The Program for Urban Amelioration." For similar views expressed by other planning experts, see Floyd Ratchford and Bleeker Marquette, "Tale of Two Countries: Spain, Iraq," *Journal of Housing* 16 (January 1959): 8–12, 18; and P. W. Macfarlane, "The Plan for Baghdad, the Capital of Iraq," *Housing Review* 5 (November–December 1956): 193–95.

23. "The National Housing Program of Iraq." *Architeconiki* 13 (January–February 1959): 42–46.

24. Constantinos A. Doxiadis, "Architecture, Planning, and Ekistics: Abstract of the Third Part of a Lecture Series Given at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Spring 1957," *Ekistics* 7, no. 42 (April 1959): 293–96.

25. Doxiadis's close colleague, Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, pointed to the pitfalls of the New Towns and to the advantages of Doxiadis's reinterpretation of neighborhood units; see Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, "Outline of Background Paper for Expert

Group Meeting on Planning and Development of Satellite and New Towns, 1964,” Harvard Loeb Library Documents, Graduate School of Design, Harvard University. For the broader, U.N. debates on the New Towns, see United Nations, *Planning of Metropolitan Areas and New Towns* (New York: United Nations, 1967). For a summary of the criticism that surrounded the British New Towns in the 1950s, see Stanley Buder, *Visionaries and Planners* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 187–89.

26. Doxiadis Associates, “Iraq Housing Program,” Doxiadis Associates Pamphlet, no. 5, September 1959.
27. Ibid.
28. The pitfalls of High Modernist urbanism and its technocratic utopianism are insightfully exposed in James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).
29. “Tribal Housing in Iraq,” Special to the *New York Times* from Baghdad, Iraq, May 14, 1958; abstracted in *Ekistics* 5, no. 33 (June 1958): 280–82.
30. For an analysis of Fathy’s collaboration with Doxiadis in Iraq and elsewhere, see Panayiota Pyla, “Hassan Fathy Revisited: Postwar Discourses on Science Development, and Vernacular Architecture,” *Journal of Architectural Education* 60:3 (February 2007): 23–29.
31. Ibid. For other examples of the positive reception to Doxiadis’s Baghdad project, see B. S. Saini, “Housing in the Hot and Arid Tropics,” *Design* 5 (August 1961): 18–24; and Ezra Ehrenhrantz and Ogden Tanner, “The Remarkable Dr. Doxiadis,” *Architectural Forum* 114, no. 5 (May 1961): 112–16.
32. “Tribal Housing in Iraq,” 280.
33. See, e.g., Hassan Fathy, Aris Deimezis, Nikos Kyriou, and A. Marinos, “Thermal Comfort,” April 15, 1958, 1–2, document R-GA 108, Doxiadis Associates (Fathy Archives), Athens; and Doxiadis Associates, “A Regional Development Program for Greater Mussayib, Iraq, 1958,” *Ekistics* 6, no. 36 (October 1958): 149–86.
34. Gulick, “Baghdad,” 252.
35. Fethi, “Contemporary Architecture in Baghdad,” 117.
36. In the 1960s, local firms took a huge volume of work, and after the creation of the first School of Architecture in Iraq, in 1959, the number of local professionals grew dramatically.
37. A summary of the buildings that were completed appears in Doxiadis Associates, “Progress of the Housing Program,” *Monthly Report* 46, prepared for the Government of the Republic of Iraq (Athens, May 1959). Also see Gulick, “Baghdad,” 253.
38. Under Saddam Hussein, this area became infamous for the poverty and misery of the mostly Shia inhabitants, but it would be unfair to blame that on

Doxiadis Associates' plans and not on the regime's own negligence toward its citizens.

39. For Wright's proposals for Baghdad, see Siry, "Wright's Baghdad Opera House and Gammage Auditorium"; and Neil Levine, *The Architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). For a reflection on Saddam Hussein's interventions in the 1980s, see William Brantley, "The Search for Baghdad," *Urban Land* 63 (2004): 49–55.

MODERNISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST

ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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