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Back to the Future: Doxiadis’s Plans for Baghdad

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This article examines the 1955 to 1958 restructuring of Baghdad proposed by the architect and planner Constantinos Doxiadis. Analyzing the overall master plan and the design and construction of housing units and public squares, the article demonstrates how Doxiadis’s social and formal experiments, which drew on larger mid-twentieth-century debates on modernism, urbanism, regionalism, and development, also became intertwined with the Iraqi regime’s agenda for nation building. As the Iraqi capital has again become the site for new visions of reconstruction and development, it is important to critically revisit this recent history of the city.

Keywords: Constantinos Doxiadis; Ekistics; Baghdad; Iraq; Dynapolis; modernist urbanism; postcolonial modernization programs

In August 1955, when Constantinos A. Doxiadis was solicited by the Iraq Development Board to prepare an ambitious housing program for the young nation of Iraq, the Greek architect and planner was just beginning to launch his private practice. He had been a Greek government official between 1945 and 1951—first as the coordinator of postwar reconstruction and then as the administrator of the Marshall Plan aid to Greece—and was thus already well known among American and international development circles. His work in postcolonial Iraq was to provide a vital stepping stone for a prolific international practice that would eventually establish Doxiadis as an international expert on housing and urban development.

By May 1959, when his Athens-based firm was forced out of Iraq (in the aftermath of a political coup in July 1958), Doxiadis Associates had already established branches well beyond Baghdad: in Karachi, Beirut, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Washington D.C. Soon later, during the 1960s, Doxiadis was to become known as “the world’s busiest planner” and a “remodeler of the world”; while his journal Ekistics circulated in dozens of countries.1

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This study focuses on the beginnings of Doxiadis’s international career by examining his work in Iraq, and in particular, Doxiadis Associates’ master plan for restructuring Baghdad. Situating Doxiadis’s intervention within the larger context of Iraq’s processes of decolonization and nation building, the article also considers larger post–World War II architectural/planning debates on urbanism, modernism, science, and development that shaped Doxiadis’s planning approach. Moving from the overall master plan to the design and construction of specific housing projects, the article demonstrates how Doxiadis’s conceptions of social reform and regional particularity, along with a technocratic posture of neutrality, became intertwined with the Iraqi regime’s aspirations to assert a young nation’s modernity and nurture pride among its citizens. The goal is to uncover how Doxiadis’s formal and social experiments became vehicles for building a modern nation state and to underline the significance of the postcolonial context of Baghdad in the larger rethinking of modernism that characterized the post–World War II era. As new visions for reconstructing Baghdad are once again becoming current, it is particularly important to put this recent history of the city in critical perspective.

**Context 1: Iraq’s Programs for Socioeconomic Modernization**

To understand the context of Doxiadis’s proposal for Baghdad, it helps to remember that the city had already been experiencing dramatic transformations since the beginning of the twentieth century, when it changed ruling hands from the Ottomans to the British. In 1921, when the British established a constitutional monarchy that brought the Hashimites as the rulers of the newly formed Iraq, Baghdad became the capital of the young nation, and since then, it grew by leaps and bounds both in size and in population. In 1932, Iraq became independent, but after a series of tribal and ethnic revolts, military coups, and countercoups, it was reoccupied by the British who installed a pro-Western government headed by Nuri al-Sa’id in 1941. Between the 1920s and the 1940s, Baghdad’s population tripled, reaching more than half a million, and the city burst out of the centuries-old confines—defined by the settlement of Rusafah on the east bank of the Tigris, Al-Karkh on the west bank, and Kazimiyah and Azimiyah further north. Especially after the 1920s construction of a flood-protection dyke that stretched from the Tigris north of Azimiyah to the Diyala river east of Karradah, the urban fabric expanded laterally in two directions: northwest toward Azimiyah and southwest toward the Diyala (Figure 1). Some large-scale government-sponsored developments (e.g., the 1920s Waziriyah) introduced systematic layouts, broad avenues, and somewhat suburban sections that stood out in stark contrast to Rusafah’s medieval feel—which
was characterized by souks and narrow tunnel-like residential streets, the result the projecting wooden upper stories of the dense houses.³

In the 1950s, Baghdad experienced even more rapid transformations with the establishment of the Iraq Development Board—a quasigovernmental body overseeing an accelerated program of national modernization in the young nation of Iraq with the support of Western consultants. The board had at its disposal the lion’s share of the oil revenues (which increased dramatically in the early 1950s as foreign ownership of the Iraqi petroleum diminished), and its activities unfolded in the context of the pro-British government’s campaign to introduce a new era of political stability. Chaired by Iraq’s premier himself, the board oversaw the construction of dams, irrigation and drainage systems, bridges, roads, factories, power plants, housing, schools, hospitals, and public buildings.⁴

Doxiadis was solicited at a point when the Iraq Development Board increased its funding for housing and community facilities, in an effort to
provide more readily visible signs of progress and prevent social unrest. The need for popular gestures of social reform seemed urgent because the increasingly unpopular Iraqi government saw “uncomfortably obvious” parallels between Iraq and Czarist Russia and was nervously hoping to secure political stability to sustain itself. For similar reasons, British and American consultants also encouraged reform hoping that Iraq, seen as an important Middle Eastern bastion against communism, would not replicate the experience of Egypt, where a 1952 revolt brought the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Soviet-allied policies. Doxiadis Associates’ initial charge was to create a comprehensive five-year plan for the improvement of housing conditions throughout the country, and his firm began with projects in Mosul, Kirkuk, Mussayib, and Baghdad; eventually, he was assigned additional tasks, including the master plan for Baghdad that will be discussed in detail below.

Context 2: Doxiadis’s Appeal

Doxiadis was recommended to the Iraq Development Board by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, one of the key foreign organizations in the board. Even though Doxiadis had little to show in terms of independent built works (he barely had any staff in his newly established firm when the Iraq board solicited him in 1955), he succeeded in securing this commission. What distinguished Doxiadis among the many Western consultants, advisers, and technicians who were streaming into Iraq was partly his Greek background, which, as The New Yorker later put it, rendered him free of “an imperialist stigma.” Another reason that made Doxiadis appealing stemmed from the planning approach he named Ekistics, which emphasized a rational and scientific version of urbanism, rendering his proposals with an apolitical authority. Defined as “the science of human settlements,” Ekistics was initially formulated by Doxiadis during his work in Greece and promised to synthesize the input of economics, geography, sociology, anthropology, and other sciences. “More science,” Doxiadis hoped, would guard against designers’ arbitrary self-expression and reconceptualize architecture and planning as rational processes of accommodating human needs. Emblematic of a modernist ambition to coordinate the entire system of knowledge about the physical environment, Ekistics’s multidisciplinary approach had a twofold goal: First, to provide a corrective to the earlier modernist urbanism by rejecting the ethos of the individual signature designer and by emphasizing basic human needs, nonfunctionalist and extratechnological concerns, that would accommodate housing and resource shortages and other post–World War II urban predicaments. Second, Ekistics aimed to reinvent architects and planners as development experts by emphasizing the significance of the physical environment in promoting socioeconomic
Ekistics’s commitment to international urbanization, industrialization, and socioeconomic modernization was in tune with the agenda of international development institutions to advance global social restructuring according to the paradigm of the industrialized West. At the background of such development goals was of course the Cold War’s bitter ideological divide. However, Doxiadis diligently distanced his rhetoric from such leanings, by framing Ekistics as a scientific method aimed at fulfilling the needs of the “common people” and were applicable to all societies, “communist and capitalist alike.” From the perspective of the Iraq Development Board, such a claim to scientific neutrality conveniently concealed the anti-communist fears and pro-Western alliances that motivated the board’s own modernizing agenda. The technocratic optimism of Ekistics appeared as a promise that social, economic, racial, and ethnic inequalities could be managed away, to make the modernization projects acceptable to the highly diverse citizenry of Iraq.

Doxiadis’s appeal also stemmed from his promise that even if Ekistics would apply scientific truths with transnational applicability, it would also make its interventions amenable to local cultural preferences. Doxiadis pledged that he would not act like a “magician planner,” who “has all the solutions up his sleeve and he pulls them out like rabbits.” Often implying criticism for the new cities emerging in the postcolonial world (and sometimes pointing the finger directly at Brasilia in Brazil and Chandigarh in India), Doxiadis promised that his firm would overcome the functionalist, universalist, and ultimately eurocentric and homogenizing preoccupations of other modernist interventions by embarking on exhaustive surveys and research programs that would identify each locale’s specific needs and potentials. These dual claims to a scientific legitimacy and cultural sensitivity constituted the right combination for the Iraq Development Board, whose eagerness in providing architectural symbols of a modern state was accompanied by a desire to champion a shared ideal of national identity and pride.

The Restructuring of Baghdad

In 1958, and while the firm was already constructing various rural and urban housing schemes around the country, the Iraq Development Board also assigned it the task of creating a new master plan for the rapidly expanding Baghdad. As the administrative capital of a new nation being welded together, Baghdad was already the center of the board’s activities. Not only did the board turn it into a magnet for new business but also made it the site of ambitious experiments by world famous architects. Le Corbusier was invited to build a mammoth sports stadium, Walter Gropius, with The Architects Collaborative, to design a university campus, Alvar Aalto to design...
a civic center, Frank Lloyd Wright to design an opera house, among others.\textsuperscript{14} Iraqi architects, most of whom were educated in Europe, also became involved, including Mohamed Makiya, Kahtan Awni, and Rifat Chadirji. Doxiadis Associates was put in charge of the overall master plan of the modern capital of the thriving republic. The master plan was supposed to provide the comprehensive framework into which the various building projects would be integrated. An earlier master plan by the British firm Minoprio & Spenceley and P. W. Macfarlane in 1956 had proposed a road system to connect the premodern urban core with new river bridges and outlined zoning principles.\textsuperscript{15} Doxiadis Associates’ master plan aspired to provide a more comprehensive framework for modernization. Incorporating its pilot projects already underway in the capital, the firm made a double promise to improve housing for all, while providing the foundation for long-term urban and regional growth.\textsuperscript{16} Always preoccupied with managerial control and comprehensiveness, Doxiadis seemed perfect for this job.

Doxiadis Associates’ master plan was based on a planning model of urban expansion, control, and efficiency that Doxiadis would later call \textit{Dynapolis}. Meaning “dynamic city,” \textit{Dynapolis} was one of Doxiadis’s many neologisms that would make glossaries a necessary feature of the numerous books he would write in his later career. The core of \textit{Dynapolis} was to expand continually along an axis to avert congestion, and the business district would grow along this axis controlled by zoning and the sitting of public buildings, road systems, and green areas. The residential areas would also expand continually along the core’s flanks, echoing the open-ended logic of “linear city” concepts tracing back to Arturo Soria y Mata’s 1882 Ciudad Lineal near Madrid and to Tony Garnier’s Cite Industrielle (1901), not to mention the Soviet Linear Cities in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{17}

Doxiadis Associates identified the Tigris river as the main reference for establishing a central axis of growth. Even though the concept of \textit{Dynapolis} theoretically allowed for indefinite urban expansion, Doxiadis set the ideal limits of the future Iraqi capital to three million—approximately three times larger than the 1958 population. This idealized population figure suggested Baghdad’s maximum limits, defined with an elongated rectangle orientated along the main northwest–southeast axis of the river (Figure 2).\textsuperscript{18} This rectangular area was not only subdivided by a system of road patterns that incorporated some of the existing major roads but also suggested the opening of new roads that would adopt a rectilinear pattern. The new road system was to provide “an easy connection of the city to the country,” to tie the city into a larger regional schema.\textsuperscript{19} Residential sectors and subsectors were also arranged according to a rectangular grid system, modified in the middle, to accommodate the commercial district. The commercial district included the existing old city center and also new commercial centers expected to emerge along the main axis of the \textit{Dynapolis}. The new commercial centers would have to abide by the rectilinear logic of the road system and residential grid.
The same logic also guided the shape of the industrial districts, which were pushed to the very edges of the city’s maximum limits, so as not to preserve the uniformity of residential–commercial districts.

The master plan did more than prescribe Baghdad’s orderly expansion. Behind the preoccupation with visual order, uniformity, and regularity, was a larger goal to reinvent the old city as an efficient modern capital and make it a symbol and an instrument of modernization. This ambition was widespread among all planning experts in Baghdad, who pushed for lower densities and wider streets, just as much as they emphasized the need for fresh water, electric power, and sewage systems—failing to recognize the public role of the old city’s urban density and overlooking the fact that the colorful souks of the old city, despite their narrowness and darkness (or because of it!), had an immense social value. Such a preoccupation with formal clarity was of course typical of high-modernist urbanism, whose grand visions for the rational engineering of social life found fertile ground
in the post–World War II era, especially in the postcolonial world—both under the auspices of pro-Western regimes such as those that solicited Doxiadis and under the auspices of regimes with socialist leanings. Among his contemporaries, Doxiadis Associates could in fact be distinguished for the comparatively extensive attention the firm paid to the old city center and its spatial qualities. (The eight volumes of diaries that were produced by Doxiadis’s Iraq team are full of photos, sketches, and detailed analyses of old cities and existing housing communities in the country—and the sheer extent of that documentation is impressive.) If this type of appreciation ultimately came through in the plan for Baghdad, it was in the firm’s gesture to bypass much of the old street fabric of Rusafah and Al Karkh by stipulating that only the future growth of the commercial and business district should introduce the rectilinear logic of their master plan. In this sense, Doxiadis Associates’ scheme reflected greater sensitivity than the plan that actually materialized in the 1970s, when the establishment of a different set of two main longitudinal thoroughfares—today’s Al Jumhuriya and Haifa Streets—brought the distraction of many mosques, souks, schools, and houses in these old sectors. Similar gestures to reconcile an overarching imperative for regularity with local aesthetic preferences were made in the specific housing projects described below.

Model Community in West Baghdad

Doxiadis Associates’ restructuring of the city along functional lines became the basis for the design of a model community in the west part of the city. The “Western Baghdad Development Scheme” was to house a population of 100,000, either through government-funded housing or through self-help housing. The scheme was composed of different “community sectors” of seven to ten thousand people, and each sector provided for administrative, social, educational, health and other community buildings, shopping centers, green areas, coffee houses, and mosques (Figures 3 and 4). Echoing the social and functionalist logic of the “neighborhood units” of the post–World War II British New Towns, the plan provided key social facilities within walking distance, favoring pedestrian movement. Unlike the dynamic growth emphasized in the master plan, each sector had a rather static quality with a predetermined size and prescribed dimensions for each plot, roads, and public areas. This was the firm’s tactic for preserving each sector’s human scale even in an ever growing urban environment.

The logic of functional separation that guided the master plan and the configuration of each sector also extended to the system of social ordering. Each community sector in western Baghdad was broken down to smaller socio-spatial units arranged hierarchically. The smallest, called “community class I,” was constituted by ten to twenty families of similar
income. A group of three to seven such communities made a community “class II,” also having a homogenous economic status. House types, all of which promised the basics of sanitation and safety, also corresponded to the income-based hierarchy. The hierarchical logic continued: An agglomeration of class II communities plus an elementary school was designated a community “class III.” Class III communities of different income groups, plus a market and shops, and a teahouse and a mosque could constitute a community “class IV,” namely the “community sector” of seven to ten thousand. This “community sector” constituted “the basic element” of Baghdad’s urban plan, and it was actually a prototype for the basic element of many cities subsequently designed. Doxiadis Associates’ overall plan for west Baghdad was actually a plan for a community class V (combining a group of sectors class IV) that would join other parts of the city to create a class VI community (Baghdad) that would then join larger regional communities, and so on.

In the speeches analyzing his work, Doxiadis tried to contextualize such abstractions of “scales” and “hierarchies” by arguing that the smaller class I, II, and III communities of Baghdad corresponded to sizes found in Iraqi towns and villages. The larger scales, then, were explained as new phenomena necessitated by advanced transportation and communication
technologies. As Doxiadis’s close colleague, Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, pointed out, the multiple hierarchies of communities were an attempt to correct British versions of “self-contained” neighborhoods in New Towns, that prescribed an optimum size of neighborhoods, and were already facing criticism for failing to account for people’s increasing dependence on the automobile and new industrial needs for mobility. Doxiadis Associates hoped to introduce some flexibility to the idea of optimum sizes by inscribing each community within larger ones. Ironically, however, the firm remained bounded by a rather linear hierarchical logic that assumed that communities and sub-communities could neatly fit into each other.

The social ambition behind the ordering of the community sector was that the small homogeneous residential communities (class I and II) would then interact among them (on a “class III” level and beyond) to promote a slow and controlled intermixing of social classes and the gradual “development of social balance among the several classes of the citizens.” This was Doxiadis Associates’ attempt at social engineering that tried to accommodate the government administrator’s demands that “different classes should not be mixed,” while it also catered to the regime’s campaign to eliminate sectarian and tribal divisions. Doxiadis Associates’ proposals, however, did not
reflect on the specific demographic dynamics in the city (caused, for example, by the emigration of most of the city’s Jewish population to Israel after 1947 or the influx of rural population, including many Christians and Kurds from the north and Shias from the south). For all of the firm’s reports, Doxiadis Associates steered away from the city’s intricate tribal, nomadic, ethnic, and other social formations that created tight communities inside the city. The proposals were instead confined to vague references to a “proper” grouping among different communities that would allegedly create “a healthy community spirit.” Translated into formal gestures, “proper” grouping of social groups meant, for example, the insertion of middle-class housing between upper- and lower-income neighborhoods so as to minimize direct contact between opposite sides of the economic spectrum. Some residential sectors were even separated with “green spaces” that acted as soft barriers among classes. Such design strategies were not about any substantive social equity but about an administrative ordering of the society. Understood more in visual and aesthetic terms, this kind of rational ordering of both the urban fabric and the society echoes many examples of twentieth century high-modernist urbanism and its grand visions for the rational engineering of social life. The irony in this particular case is that Ekistics was framed precisely as a rejection of aesthetic preoccupations in favor of what were considered as more basic human needs.

Local Particularity in the Functional Plan

Certain gestures within the master plan were specifically intended to accommodate local social habits and formal vocabularies, as though to insert local character into the rational methodology of housing. One such gesture was the introduction of the so-called “gossip square” for each group of ten to fifteen attached houses that was to serve as “a modern substitute for the traditional gathering places of tribal life” and to facilitate the transformation of the village dweller to an urban dweller (Figure 5). The “gossip square” was an idea from Hassan Fathy, the Egyptian architect who joined the Ekistics group in 1957, and the name was apparently inspired by an observation that similar points of interest existed in traditional neighborhoods of Baghdad and that they were usually places where women would gather. Overlooking, at least initially, the deep-rooted gender and cultural stereotypes implied in the name, the firm embraced the “gossip square” as an element that demonstrated its cultural sensitivity. The strategy was effective in attracting favorable press. A New York Times journalist, for example, described how the new housing in Baghdad compared favorably with other modernist interventions in the following way:
Iraqi housing authorities, instead of razing present slums and erecting tenements on their site, are creating groups of new sub-hamlets in the adjoining countryside to provide the close family and tribal relationship the rural Arab knew in his ancestral home. . . . The sub-hamlets are built in groups of ten or fifteen small attached houses beside a pedestrian way, at the end of which is a small gossip square. 31

The article went even further, giving its praise for Doxiadis Associates’ interventions an anticommunist spin! By nurturing a strong sense of community, the article argued, the new housing was combating the void and loneliness felt in other, unsuccessful urban environments, which were threatening to make urban dwellers “overly susceptible to conversion by communist agents.” 32 This is how the anxieties of the cold war were reframed as a desire for harmony and community spirit.

Doxiadis himself soon became weary of the popularity of the term “gossip square,” because its overuse, he felt, caused misunderstandings as to the firm’s larger goals. In a memo to his firm in April 1957, Doxiadis asked that the term be replaced with “community squares of first degree.” 33 Of course, even with the more neutral and universal name, the square was still seen as one of the gestures that catered to the locale. Others were the inclusion of
hamams and mosques in each sector or the occasional covered market with a roof shape reminiscent of traditional souks. Such elements, however, catered more to an orientalist nostalgia than any profound understanding of Iraq’s public life, the intense heterogeneity of its society, or its aspirations to modernity. Still overpowered by the modular functional plan, the gossip squares, hamams, and mosques were subsumed by the grand formal and social order of the master plan.

A similar critique could be extended to Doxiadis Associates’ studies of local climate and formal vocabularies. Climatic conditions were treated abstractly in terms of solar exposures, wind patterns, and rainfall data, never really becoming an integral part of material choices, spatial conceptions, or larger design sensibilities. Doxiadis Associates may have recognized the open-air courtyard and colonnaded upper gallery as typical of the region’s residential architecture, but the firm’s own reinterpretations in its standardized “house types” pushed courtyards to the side or to the back of each unit, thereby losing any of the traditional courtyards’ climatic benefits and secluded qualities (Figures 6 and 7). Similarly, Doxiadis Associates’ attempts to reinterpret wooden window screens with reinforced concrete produced larger patterns of openings that were not nearly as effective in increasing wind pressure, in softening sunlight, or in providing a sense of privacy. This is why Doxiadis
Associates’ housing units ultimately compared unfavorably with the old city’s mud huts with movable roofs, in terms of their microclimate. Despite all the research and analysis of the locale, what prevailed most was an aesthetic imperative of standardization, which left little opportunity to contemplate a more cultured conception of the human subject or to conceive of urban development itself as a cultural process tied to the locale.

Conclusion

Despite the Iraqi government’s attempts to secure political stability through modernization and the nurturing of national pride, a military coup in July 1958, led by General Abd al-Karim al-Qasim, brought the brutal deposition of the Hashimite monarchy and its replacement by a revolutionary republic with socialist leanings (until eventually, a series of coups d’etat would establish the Baath as the only legitimate party). In this new climate, modernization plans changed direction, becoming more self-conscious in their anti-Western claims, and leaving no room for the kind of universalism Doxiadis advanced. Even local architects like Makiya and Chadirji who had previously collaborated with Doxiadis Associates began to shift direction to abandon the technocratic and universalist ethos of Ekistics in favor of more
explicit valorizations of local cultural roots.\textsuperscript{36} Under these circumstances, Doxiadis Associates’ commission was cancelled in May 1959, leaving the Athens-based firm out of the new building boom of Baghdad in the next decade.\textsuperscript{37} By the time they left, however, Doxiadis Associates had completed the construction of hundreds of units (not only some neighborhoods in western Baghdad but also a few in the northeast side of the city and the army canal, which are still referred to by the locals as “Doxiadis’s houses”) that would become the precedent for many of the firm’s future projects.\textsuperscript{38} After Doxiadis Associates’ departure from Iraq, their plan for Baghdad was abandoned, although it occasionally became a vague reference for later proposals. For example, the handful of neighborhoods Doxiadis Associates developed in the northeast side of the city became a starting point for an enormous residential area that expanded on a rectilinear grid and later became known as Al Thawra. (Under Saddam Hussein this area became infamous for the poverty and misery of the mostly Shia inhabitants—but one cannot possibly blame Doxiadis Associates’ plans and not on the regime’s own negligence toward its citizens.)

Looking back at the master plan today, one may smile at the certainty of Doxiadis’s predictions for the future, which, for all their comprehensive claims, failed to account for impact of war, international trade sanctions, political and military relationships, and other geopolitical power dynamics, which, as we now know, were to shape Baghdad’s future (even Doxiadis’s prediction of an ideal population of three million grossly underestimated the growth of the city now at 4.5 million). One will have to concede, nonetheless, that Doxiadis Associates’ attempt to contemplate the dilemmas of Iraq’s postimperialist identity compares favorably to rigid appropriations of local heritage—see for example, Frank Lloyd Wright’s orientalizing references in his scheme for the opera house, not to mention the later Baath regime’s populist distortions of the country’s cultural heritage\textsuperscript{39}—that entirely missed the ambiguities in concepts of local tradition and heritage. For all its pitfalls, Doxiadis Associates’ plan was significant in contemplating the role of architecture/planning in the messy realities of postcolonial nationhood. And, in fact, because of the ironies of his intervention, Doxiadis’s tactics of physical and social restructuring gain an altogether new relevance today, when new strategies for reconstruction and nation building in Iraq are being debated all over again.

Notes


3. For a description of Waziriyah and Rusafah, see Gulick, 1967, 250 and 246. See also John Searles, “City Problems Observed in Iraq, Greece, Germany,” \textit{The Journal of Housing} (March 1959):


8. The *New Yorker* article explained Doxiadis’s success as follows: “Doxiadis has the sort of European abilities that are needed—he is up on the latest planning techniques, and he runs his firm with northern (or, ‘western’) efficiency—but, being a Greek, he is free of the imperialist stigma.” C. Rand, “The Ekistic World,” 53. Furthermore, Floyd Ratchford, an American development consultant who collaborated with Doxiadis in Iraq, observed that Doxiadis “represents something new on the international ‘technical assistance’ scene.” Floyd Ratchford and Bleeker Marquette, “Tale of Two Countries: Spain, Iraq,” *The Journal of Housing* (January 1959): 8-12, 18.


12. Ibid.


18. In its later versions, Dynapolis would advance toward one direction alone, but in its first version in Baghdad, growth was two-directional.


21. For critiques of other versions of postcolonial urbanism and the politics of modernization, see for example, Vikramaditya Prakash, *Chandigarh’s Le Corbusier: The Struggle for Modernity in Postcolonial India* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven [Conn.]:
26. This expectation on behalf of the Iraqi government is repeatedly mentioned in Doxiadis’s diaries, which kept a detailed record of his meetings with Iraqi officials—for example, Doxiadis Associates, *Iraq Diaries Vol. 1* (1955). [Archive Files 23873, Constantinos Doxiadis Archive]
32. Ibid.
37. In the 1960s, local firms took a huge volume of work and after the creation of the first school of architecture in Iraq in 1959, the number of local professionals grew dramatically.

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